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RECENT CASES
ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle, and the term "use" includes
the loading and unloading thereof. The words "arising out of" seem to have
a broad significance. One could understand it to mean originating from,
having its origin in, growing out of or flowing from, incident to or having
connection with the use of the vehicle.13 In the instant case the accident
clearly flowed from or grew out of the unloading.
The adoption of the complete operation theory appears to be the more
modern view,1 3 and where the liability policy does not define unloading
it would seem that this theory would more effectively implement the intent
of the parties.
14
North Dakota has not had to deal with the problem, but Minnesota 15
and Wisconsin 16 are among the states 1T which have adopted the more
limited 18 coming to rest doctrine. Montana 19 follows the view which appears
to be that the majority of courts in accepting the complete operation doctrine.
"1
KENNETH YRI
JUDGMENT - DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS - NECESSITY OF A JUSTICIABLE CON-
TROVERSY. - The action involed a petition for declaratory judgment of the
validity of a city zoning ordinance, which prohibits the plaintiff from erecting
signs on the roofs of its buildings. In an impending eminent domain proceed-
ing, an electric company sought to condemn a right of way to string wires over
the plaintiff's buildings. The amount of compensation due plaintiff from the
electric company was dependent upon the validity of the ordinance, since the
space above the buildings had value only for the display of signs, and the
electric company agreed to delay its proceeding pending the declaratory judg-
ment. It was held, on appeal, that there was no justiciable controversy between
plaintiff and city. Mayor, etc. of Savannah v. Bay Realty Co., 82 S.E.2d 710,
(Ga. 1954).
It is well settled that the existence of a justiciable controversy is essential
12. See Schmidt v .Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181, 184 (1944).
13. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dalton Coal and Material Co., supra note 8; Red Ball
Motor Freight inc. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, supra note 5;
Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., supra note 8; Pacific Auto Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co. of New York, supra note 1.
14. See Turtlelaub v. Hardwars Mut. Cas. Co., 26 N.J. Misc. 316, 62 A.2d 830, 834
(1948).
15. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., supra note 3. (Goods
were taken off insured truck and put on sidewalk. The injury occurred when they were
put on hand trucks and moved into a building. Held, the unloading process terminated
when goods were removed from the truck and placed on the sidewalk). Contra: B & D.
Motor Lines Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 181 Misc. 985, 43 N.Y.S.2d 486
(1943).
16. Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wisc. 348, 276 N.W. 629 (1937) (The insured
truck was used to deliver beer. Driver removed a cover from the manhole in the side-
walk and placed the beer keg on 'the sidewalk and later placed the keg through the
hatchway. While driver was inside making out a sales slip plaintiff fell into the hatch-
way. Court held that the unloading process had been completed when the beer keg was
placed on the sidewalk.)
17. Ferry .v Protective Indemnity Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 38 A.2d 493 (1944);
American Cas. Co. v. Fisher, 195 Ga. 136, 23 S.E.2d 395 (1942).
18. See Red Ball Motor Freight Inc. v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wiscon-
sin, supra note 6 at 377.
19. State ex rel Butte Brewing Co. v. Dist. Ct. for Silver Bow County, supra note 4.
(Beer was lowered from the truck to the sidewalk. Employee theen went into establish-
nent and was raising a door from the sidewalk when a person stepped on the door and
was injured. Court held that the unloading of the beer was a continuous operation from
the time the truck came to a stop until the beer was delivered to its destination.)
20. See note 8 supra. L
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
to a successful suit for a declaratory judgment., The term "actual controversy"
apparently has been equated with the term "justiciable controversy",
-2
which exists when there are interested parties asserting adverse claims based
upon an existing state of facts.3 The essentials of a justiciable controversy
were enumerated in the North Dakota case of Iverson v. Tweeden.
4 It
required that: (1) a claim of right must be asserted against one who has
an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) the party seeing relief must have a legally pro-
tectable interest, and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial deter-
mination. The law does not require the courts to render advisory opinions,5
answer moot or incidental questions,6 or furnish free legal advice that will
help the parties in another trasaction.7 The requirement of an actual con-
troversy necessarily excludes merely possible or remote disputes,8 and some
courts exclude any dispute with some contingent feature, even though all
that remains to be done is the carrying out of a determination to violate a
challenged statute.9
Such a strict interpretation of the term "actual controversy" is strongly
opposed by some courts.' 0 It is said to threaten the utility of the declaratory
judgment remedy,1 which is intended to "provide -a method whereby parties
to a justiciable controversy may have it determined in advance of any in-
vasion of rights or breach of obligation."12 The word "actual" is interpreted
by these courts as one of emphasis rather than definition, 1 3 and is considered
not necessarily incongruous with matters contingent, as long as the contin-
gency promises to become a reality. 14 Although claims must be based on an
existing state of facts,15 it has been held that they need not be in an active
stage of controversy, but merely indicative of threatened litigation in the
near future, to permit use of the declaratory judgment remedy., Using
this more liberal interpretation, courts have ruled on "actual controversies"
over contingent rights.,
It is within the scope of the declaratory judgment power for a court to
1. Brantley v. Flowers, 254 Ala. 448, 48 So.2d 532 (1950); Hyde Park Dairies v.
City of Newton, 167 Kans. 730, 209 P.2d 221 (1949); Tietiens v. City of St. Louis,
359 Mo. 439, 222 S.W.2d 70 (1919); See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 40 (2d ed.
1941).
2. Cf. Langer v. State, 69 N.D. 129, 141, 284 N.W. 238, 244 (1939).
3. See City of Nashville v. Snow, 204 Ga. 371, 49 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1948).
4. 78 N.D. 132, 138, 48 N.W.2d 367, 370 (1951).
5. North Dakota v. Perkins County, 69 S.D. 270, 9 N.W.2d 500 (1943).
6. Lyttle v. Keith, 264 Ky. 652, 95 S.W.2d 299 (1936); Capital Bank and Trust Co.
v. Greenawalt, 336 Pa. 108, 6 A.2d 790 (1939); Sova v. Reis, 226 Wis. 53, 276 N.W.
111 (1937).
7. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Taylor, 55 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1945); Hodges v. Hamblen
County, 152 Tenn. 395, 277 S.W. 901 (1925).
8. See Borchard, op cit. supra note 1 at 56.
9. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
10. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941); Sigal v.
Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 158 AtI. 891 (1932); School Committee of Cambridge v. Superin-
tendent of Schools of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 516, 70 N.E.2d 298 (1946).
11. See Note, 50 Yale L. J. 1278 (1941).
12. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 72 N.D. 359, 372, 7 N.W.2d 438, 446 (1943).
13. See Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 240, (1937); Rozelle v. Quinn,
47 Fed. Supp. 740, 742 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
14. See Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341, 345-346 (1937).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. In re Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 At. 675 (1930).
17. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941); Sigal v.
Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 158 Atl. 891 (1932);" School Committee of Cambridge v. Super-
intendent of Schools of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 516, 70 N.E.2d 298 (1946).
RECENT CASES
pass upon the validity of zoning ordinances,1
8 provided an actual controversy
cxists.11 Sufficient controversy has been found in threatened non-compliance
with a penal statute.20 However, in the instant case, there was no justiciable
controversy within either the strict or liberal view set forth above. The dis-
puted enactment violated no apparent right of the petitioner, either present
or prospective. Not only had the plaintiff failed to violate the ordinance,
but it also apparently had decided to forego any future sign building,
since it had allowed the electric company to string wires before the eminent
domain proceedings. The petitioner's real dispute was with the electric
company, not the municipality that enacted the ordinance. It seems that
the granting of the judgment in this case would have constituted a flagrant
misuse of the declaratory judgment remedy.
Although the remedy under consideration should be flexible, it does not
encompass the granting of purely advisory opinions.2 1 If any individual could
demand judicial determination of validity of any legislative enactment, the gov-
ernment unit involved would be forced into an unlimited number of costiy
defense actions, and the benefits derived from such actions would probably
be negligible. Such an extension of this invaluable remedy would also admit
to litigation a burdensome number of speculative disputes which may never
become ripe for judicial determination and should not be permitted to con-
sume the time of our courts.
GEORGE DYNES
OIL AND GAS - LEASES AND ASSIGNMENTS - INTEREST CREATED THEREBY. -
On appeal of an action for damages for breach of an oral agreement by de-
fendant to accept from plaintiff assignments of oil and gas leases it was held,
that oil, gas and mineral leases are transfers of interests in real property
within the terms of the Statute of Frauds.Petroleum Exchange Inc. v. Poynter,
64 N.W. 2d 718 (N.D. 1954).
The nature of an oil and gas leasehold interest is a problem which has
plagued the courts of oil-producing states. It has been termed a personal
right,' a corporeal hereditament,2 an incorporeal hereditament,3 a servitude,
4
-nd a chattel real.5 Although a definition of a legal concept may not seem
overly important, once a concept is defined, certain aggregates of legal rela-
tionships result. Problems involving the nature of available remedies," taxa-
18. Andrews v. City of Piedmont, 100 Cal. App. 700, 281 Pac. 78 (1929); West
v. City of Witchita, 118 Kans. 265, 234 Pac. 978 (1925). See Borchard, op. cit. supra
note 1 at 764.
19. Taylor v. Haverford Tp., 299 Pa. 402, 149 Atl. 639 (1930).
20. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N.Y.S.
288 (1936). contra: City of Nashville v. Snow, 204 Ga. 371, 49 S.E.2d 808 (1948).
21. See note 5 supra.
1. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
2. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909).
3. Lake v. Sealy, 231 Ala. 446, 165 So. 399 (1936); Robinson v. Smalley, 102 Kan.
842, 171 Pac. 1155 (1918);, Denver Land Bank v. Dixon, 57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d
842 (1942).
4. Nabors Oil & Gas Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920).
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sallings's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920).
5. Richardson v. Callahan, 213 Cal. 683, 3 P.2d 927 (1931).
6. E.g., Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915).
